This paper presents a unique city branding case applying narrative analysis to the marketing manager's account of his long running campaign to brand Logan City. The analysis finds that the campaign has many of the hallmarks of social marketing, but focuses strongly on citizen's positive self image and social capital development. Elements of city branding are employed but the approach is 'self directed', rather than the usual approach of 'other directed'. The desired outcomes are a positive self and community image laying the foundation for a community confident to undertake various economic development tasks. Implications for social marketing theory and management and future research are discussed.

This study examines whether a firm's corporate governance system, particularly with respect to the characteristics of the board of directors and senior management, affects how accurately the impact of accounting changes is reported to shareholders. We concentrate on the relation between corporate governance measures and accounting forecast errors that arise with adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards by listed Australian firms. Evidence reveals that corporate governance mechanisms are associated with the likelihood and magnitude of managerial forecast errors. It is widely accepted that sound financial disclosure mitigates agency problems by bridging the information asymmetry gap existing between management and shareholders. In contrast, poor financial disclosure often misleads shareholders and has adverse effects on their wealth. In recent years, researchers have found that corporate ownership structure and board composition affect financial reporting quality, proxied by management forecast precision, earnings restatements and voluntary disclosure of informational items (e.g., Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; and Beekes and Brown, 2006). Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that attributes of corporate boards and audit committees are positively associated with voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts and that these forecasts are more precise when the board of directors and audit committees are effective. A recent study of Australian listed entities (Beekes and Brown, 2006) finds that a firm's corporate governance quality is positively associated with disclosure quality, as measured by its informativeness to the securities market.
This study extends this line of research on the association between corporate governance structure and management forecast accuracy following the recent adoption of Australian equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards in Australia (hereafter AIFRS). Prior to full implementation of AIFRS, firms were required to disclose expected significant effects in their last AGAAP annual report and the actual effects on their earnings and equity after adopting AIFRS. In implementing the switch to AIFRS, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) warned entities to make their disclosures as accurate as possible by adequately informing users of the impact of the transition to the new standards. Otherwise, the ASIC would consider appropriate intervention in relation to significant non-compliance with the standards (ASIC, 2005). This study seeks to assess the precision of corporate managers in forecasting material effects on earnings and equity in implementing the various AIFRS. Our expectation is that the quality of disclosure, as measured by forecast errors, is related to the quality of a firm's governance structure.
Recent accounting scandals in Australia (e.g., HIH Insurance Ltd) and abroad (e.g., Enron Corporation) have resulted in increased regulation that it is argued will improve the quality of financial reporting with a focus on the responsibilities of the board of directors and senior management. For example, the HIH Royal Commission final report (Owen, 2003) contains no fewer than sixty-one regulatory recommendations, with about 34 per cent referring to governance, financial reporting and assurance issues. Part of the Australian response to the perceived failure of a firm's system of corporate governance, particularly with respect to the board of directors and the auditors, has been the issuance in 2003 of the ‘Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations’ (hereafter ASX Principles), by the Australian Stock Exchange's (ASX's) Corporate Governance Council.1 The ASX Principles comprise ten core principles that the ASX expects to be consistent with international best practice. One of these recommends increased independence for the board. A definition of independence is provided. As might be expected, this definition is strict. A variable measured in accordance with this definition is included in the tests of the present paper.
Using a sample of 154 firms (27 firms with no AIFRS reconciliation, 102 firms with no errors and 25 firms with errors), with annual reporting dates of December through May, we find that firms with material errors have relatively smaller blockholder shareholdings than firms with no material errors from AIFRS adoption. Also revealed is that ‘error’ firms have managing directors with a longer tenure than ‘no error’ firms. These results are evident in both univariate and multivariate tests.

Issues of trust and control are two major determinants for employee disengagement and organizational conflict. The following article describes how Bill Day, owner of Seaworks, a rapidly growing ocean salvage company, deals with issues of trust and employee disengagement. This article incorporates findings from an interview with Bill Day and literature on the areas of trust, employee disengagement, and the need for a personal sense of control. Key determinants for employee engagement are a sense of trust between employees and their managers as well as a sense of personal control. Restructuring efforts in the past may have been major contributors to employee disengagement. Trust must be communicated through the firm's culture and it must start from the top of the organization. A key barrier between employees and managers is the managerial reluctance to delegate authority and devolve power. This conflict between the organization's goals and the goals of its managers is a major catalyst for organizational dysfunctionality. There may be a direct correlation between managerial reluctance to delegate decision-making and employee disengagement. This defensive posture by management negatively affects employee-management trust and employees' sense of control in the workplace. While attempts at organizational delayering and employee involvement in decision-making have often failed in the past, a commonsense approach is suggested with a heightened probability of success. This paper suggests a practical means of reducing the incidence of employee disengagement and thereby increasing productivity and performance. Issues concerning trust and control in organizations are resolved. It is also posited that such proposed organizational improvements will reduce workplace conflict and absenteeism, employee turnover, and increase economy of effort, thereby lowering costs and improving profitability.

This paper intends to describe examples of entrepreneurial growth and defensive strategies used by smaller firms against larger and aggressive competitors. It aims to focus specifically on the use of strategies of deception, which, for the purposes of this discussion, are defined as legal, but unexpected methods of pre-empting or countering potentially harmful competitor actions

This paper explores and discusses the financial issues faced by firms in a natural disaster. It introduces the disaster risk environment and the factors that affect the operations of a firm. The implications of a natural disaster in terms of unsystematic and systematic risks, investment evaluation, strategic investment, and risk and compliance are addressed. It provides a framework to analyse the disaster risk exposure of a firm and how it might be used in risk management. The discussions in this paper are relevant to the Wenchuan earthquake in China in May 2008.

The financial crisis in the UK began in late 2008 and the consequential economic recession has brought to the attention of media, commentators, policy makers and academics the importance of corporate governance. This research explores UK governance, what it means, what are its influences and how it is changing at the time of this financial crisis. The researchers conducted a series of qualitative interviews in five UK companies across a spectrum of industries (including institutional investors) in late 2008. Three key propositions were investigated: Proposition 1 is that board characteristics, the importance of which are pronounced by agency theorists are not the only key factor in ‘best practice’ governance. Proposition 2 is that shareholders and stakeholder involvement in governance will improve governance practices. Proposition three is that key to understanding governance failures is examining cognition and behaviours inside the black box of decision-making. Propositions two and three were supported by the interviews. The main conclusions are that the importance of good governance in establishing trust again at the time of the financial crisis is key and changes seem to be called for in a number of areas: in enhancing shareholder voice; better disclosure in explaining variations to the application of the principles of the Combined Code, in explaining risks, and in how decisions are made; and ensuring that executive remuneration is more clearly linked to profits, costs of capital and risk and reflects long-term value creation.